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STATEM!'.NT OF THE CASE 
Kature of the Case 
The calculated to not to Its is to 
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty m the onh effectively available way-by 
removing the incentive to disregard it. Brown v. Texas, 422 U.S. 590. 599-600 (1975)). 
Because of this, the Idaho Supreme Court in 5itate v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004), "expressed its 
disapproval of a rule that would allow lmv enforcement officers ·the ability to initiate consensual 
encounters \Vith pedestrians in order to seize identification and run a warrants check.,.. State v. 
Bigham, 141 Idaho 732, 735 n.2 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Page. 140 Idaho at 845). 
Yet that is precisely what happened here. Two Nampa police officers illegally detained 
Matthew Elliot Cohagan, after realizing that he was not a suspect that they had been looking for, 
to check Mr. Cohagan for outstanding warrants which would allow them to lawfully arrest him 
on the spot. The State then used those warrants to shield the officers from their illegal actions 
and introduce the illegally-obtained evidence against Mr. Cohagan. Because the evidence seized 
was a direct result of the Fourth Amendment \ iolation in this case. it must suppressed. This 
Court should vacate Mr. Cohagan· s judgment of conviction and reverse the order denying his 
motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedint!s 
The district court made the follov,ing findings of fact: 
On February 26, 2014, shortly after noon. Officer Marvin Curtis of the 
Nampa Police Department came into cnntact with the defendant, Matthevv Elliot 
Cohagan. He and Officer Otto vvere driving southbound on 12th A venue South 
and Officer Curtis testified that he saw the defendant standing on the south\vest 
comer of 12th A venue South and 7th Street South in Nampa, Idaho. Officer 
Curtis thought that the defendant resembled another individual[, Milo Morgan,] 
who had an outstanding arrest warrant To further check this out, Curtis and Otto 
turned around to get a better look at the defendant However, by the time they 
drove through the intersection, the defendant had entered the Albertson's grocery 
store on 12th Avenue and 7th Street in Nampa, Idaho. 
The officers entered the Albertson's store and Otto made first contact \vith 
the defendant inside. According to Curtis. Otto asked for his identification and 
the defendant complied. His identification showed that he was Matthew Elliot 
Cohagan and not the individual that Curtis believed he resembled. After this 
consensual contact, both officers left Albertson's. Before they left the parking lot. 
Curtis testified that dispatch or another officer wanted them to go back into 
Albertson's to obtain surveillance video for an unrelated incident. He stated that 
while Otto went to obtain the video, he went to find the defendant because he 
wanted to confirm Otto's identification of the defendant. Curtis felt that the 
defendant may have given Otto a fake identification so he wanted to confirm for 
himself that the defendant was not the individual that he initially believed him to 
be. Curtis found the defendant shopping in one of the aisles. At the outset of this 
encounter, Cmiis activated his lapel video camera and recorded his contact with 
the defendant. 
The video was admitted into evidence as Exhibit No. 1. According to the 
video, Curtis approached the defendant and asked for the defendam·s name and 
his identification. The defendant handed his identification to Curtis. Curtis told 
the defendant that he resembled another man that the officers were looking for. 
Curtis then asked the defendant if he had any outstanding vvarrants. The 
defendant stated that he did not and told Curtis that Officer Otto had already 
spoken with him. Curtis replied, '"Ld me check if you have don't any \varrants." 
Curtis also told the defendant to keep his hands out of his pockets. Then Curtis 
asked defendant a second time if he had any outstanding warrants. During the 
entirety of this contact and questioning of the defendant, Curtis hdd onto the 
defendant· s identification. 
While Officer Curtis waited for dispatch to respond to the warrant check, 
the defendant asked if he could continue shopping. Curtis told the defendant that 
he could but seconds later, he quickly caught up to the defendant and told him to 
walk vvith him to the front of the store and to relax. At this time in the video, 
dispatch still had not confirmed v,-hcther or not the delendant had any warrants. 
While walking to the front of the store. the defendant placed his hands in his 
pockets. Officer Curtis reached out and grabbed the defendant's arm and told 
him to keep his hands out of his pockets. The defendant stated, .. Listen, I'm 
gonna ask you please don't do this in the store." Curtis replied by again telling 
the defendant to keep his hands out of his pockets. At this point it is evident 
from the video that dispatch still had not confirmed any warrants. 
On the video. Curtis. Otto and the defendant stood inside Albertson's at 
the front of the store and waited until the warrants were confirmed. As the three 
men walked out of the store, the defendant started walking faster and Otto told the 
defendant, "You don·t want to do this in the store." On the video, it appears that 
dispatch confirmed the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant. While still 
inside the store, Curtis told the defendant to put his hands behind his back and 
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told the defendant that he was under arrest. As they exited the store, the video 
reveals yelling and an obvious struggle before the video shuts off 
Curtis testified that there ,vas indeed a struggle as the three men left the 
store and his lapel camera was knocked off. Curtis stated that the struggle started 
when the defendant attempted to get away from them so Curtis tripped the 
defendant and all three men went down to the ground just outside the front doors 
of the grocery store. 
Officers were able to handcuff the defendant. During the search incident 
to arrest, officers discovered a yellow box containing a glass-smoking device with 
white crystal residue that tested positive for methamphetamine. According to the 
Probable Cause Affidavit, inside the box was a bag that contained 2.3 grams of 
methamphetamine. 
(R., pp.63-64 1); see also 5/6/14 Tr., p.9. L. I p.32, L.4 (testimony of Officer Curtis): R., pp.57-
59 (Mr. Cohagan 's affidavit in support of his motion to suppress).) 
After the State charged Mr. Cohagan with possession of methamphetamine (R., pp.24-
25). Mr. Cohagan filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of his unlawful 
detention (R., pp.38--40). In response, the State admitted that Ofiicer Curtis illegally seized 
Mr. Cohagan ,vhen he kept his license to run a -warrant check. (R., pp.49-51.) However, the 
State claimed that any resulting taint was cured when Ofiicer Curtis learned of the outstanding 
\Varrants. (R., p.51.) The State relied on the attenuation doctrine outlined in State v. Page. 
140 Idaho 84 L 846 (2004), which instructs courts to look at .. (1) the elapsed time between the 
misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence. (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, 
and ( 3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper lmv enforcement action." 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress. Mr. Cohagan admitted that the discovery of the 
outstanding warrant amounted to an intervening cireumstance. (5/6/14 Tr., p.35, Ls.12-17.) But 
1 With just one exeeption, Mr. Cohagan does not ehallenge the distriet eourt's findings of fact. 
As discussed in detail below, Officer Curtis knew that Mr. Cohagan was not the suspect the 
officers were looking for before Officer Curtis asked him for his license. (5/6/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-
12 (Officer Curtis testifying that "as [Mr. Cohagan] got close, maybe 10 or 15 feet away, I 
realized it was not him [the suspect], but at that point I still wanted to ask his name and ID him''.) 
he argued that the extremely short lapse of time between the unlmvful seizure and the arrest, as 
well as the flagrancy and purpose of the unlawful stop, stood against attenuation. (5/6/14 
Tr., p.35, Ls.1-11. p.35, L.18 - p.38, L.2.) The State, on the other hand, argued that the short 
lapse of time favored attenuation. (5/6/14 Tr.. p.39, L.24 - p.40. L.8.) 
The court denied Mr. Cohagan's motion. (R., pp.62-67.) The court began by explaining: 
It is undisputed that the officers· conduct in this case created an unlawful 
detention. This Court also believes that their conduct created an unnecessary risk 
to the defendant, to law enforcement officers, and to the community. The 
officers' decision to enter the sture and detain the defendant created an 
unnecessarily tense situation that could have elevated to a much bigger conflict. 
There does not appear to be any reason that the officers could not have run a 
warrant check and confirmed the existence of the arrest \rnrrant outside of the 
grocery store and before they made contact with the defendant Additionally, 
there appeared to be no reason why the officers could not have waited until the 
defendant \Valked outside of the grocery store before approaching him and made 
sure they were away from the store· s patrons. Their enthusiasm to confirm an 
arrest warrant in a grocery store created an unlawful detention and an unnecessary 
risk of harm that could have been avoided. 
(IL p.65.) The court went on to address the State's argument that the officers' discovery of the 
outstanding warrant was an intervening event that cured the taint of the officers' illegal actions: 
[T]here \Vas a minimal lapse of time hetv,een the seizure of the license and the 
discovery a [sic] valid arrest \Varrant. As to the flagrancy and purpose of the 
improper law enforcement action, Officer Curtis testified extensively that the 
individual resembled another suspect ,vho he knew had an outstanding arrest 
warrant. While this Court finds the officers' conduct in the grocery store 
unnecessary and that an unlawful detention occum.:d, the discovery of an 
outstanding warrant was clearly an intervening factor between the unlawful 
seizure and discovery of the evidence. . . . It is this intervening factor which 
permitted the officers to arrest the defendant and conduct the search incident to 
arrest. 
(R., pp.66-67.) 
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Mr. Cohagan later entered into a binding AlforcP plea agreement for possession of 
methamphetamine. reserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. (R., pp.108-114. 156-59; 9/18/14 Tr.; 2/19/15 Tr.) Consistent with the plea 
agreement, the district com1 sentenced him to serve seven years, with three years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.157, 168-70.) Mr. Cohagan timely appealed. (R., pp.171-73.) 
2 North Carolina v. A(lord, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Cohagan' s motion to suppress because the evidence 
seized was the direct result of the illegal dekmion? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When ft Denied Mr. Cohagan's Motion To Suppress Because The 
Evidence Seized Was The Direct Result Of The Illegal Detention 
A Introduction 
The district court erred in denying . Cohagan's motion to suppress. The evidence 
seized was not attenuated from Officer Cunis· illegal detention of Mr. Cohagan-it vvas in fact 
the direct result of the illegal detention Officer Curtis detained Mr. Cohagan so that he 
could run a \varrant check with Mr. Cohagan present. Because the vay purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter this type of police misconduct, the Court must suppress the 
evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. This Court accepts the trial 
court's findings of fact if they are supported 
application of constitutional principles to 
substantial evidence, bm freely reviev,s the 
Srate v. 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004) 
(citing State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159. 161 (2000)). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Cohagan's Motion To Suppress Because 
The Evidence Seized Was The Direct Result Of The Illegal Detention 
The Fourth Amendment protects the people's right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. U.S. CONST., amend. IV; see ID. CONST., art. L § 17; ivfapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 655 (1961) (the Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). Evidence that the State obtains in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is generally excluded from a prosecution of the victim of the violation. Page, 
140 Idaho at 846: Wong Sun v. United l U.S. 1, 484-85 (1963). This rule applies to 
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evidence obtained directly from the illegal gon:rnment action and evidence discovered through 
the exploitation of the original illegality. !'age. 140 Idaho at 846: Wong S1111, 371 U.S. at 484-
85. Once a defendant makes a showing that the evidence to be suppressed was casually 
connected to the illegal state action, the burden shifts to the State to show that the unlawful 
conduct did not taint the evidence. State v. C ·ardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 908-09 (Ct App. 2006). 
"·[T]he ultimate question is whether the police acquired the evidence from 'exploitation of 
[the] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishahle to be purged of the primary 
taint."' State v. Bighwn. 141 Idaho 732. 734 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting United States v. Green, 
111 F.3d 515. 520 (7th Cir. 1997). and Wong S'zm. 371 U.S. at 488). For example, the 
attenuation doctrine "·permits use of cvidcnCL' that would normally be suppressed as fruit of 
police misconduct if the causal chain betvvcen the misconduct and the discovery of the evidence 
bas been sufficiently attenuated.'' Bigham. 141 Idaho at 734. The Idaho Supreme Court in Page 
stated that courts consider the follcrning tlm:e factors to determine whether the attenuation 
doctrine applied: ·'(l) the elapsed time b..:twl..'en the misconduct and the acquisition of the 
evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances. and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of 
the improper law enforcement action:· Page. 140 Idaho at 846 (citing Green, 111 F.3d at 521 
and Brown v. Texas, 422 U.S. 590. 603-04 ( 1975)). 
Here, the balance of these three factors shows that ·"the police acquin:d the evidence from 
exploitation of [the] illegality,'' not .. by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint:' Bigham, 141 Idaho at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the 
officers' discovery of Mr. Cohagan's outstanding \Varrant acts as an intervening event, the other 
two factors-lapse of time and flagrancy and purpose of the improper lmv enforcement action-
tip the balance against attenuation. See id at 734-35 (citing Page for the proposition that "[t]he 
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discovery of a \Varrant satisfies only the seconJ prong by showing an inten <.::ning circumstance. 
The other factors, particularly ·the flagranq and purpose of the improper law enforcement 
action.· must be weighed in every case to determine whethcr the taint of that misconduct is 
sufficiently attenuated."). The district court erred by denying I\lr. Cohagan·s motion to suppress. 
I. The State Failed To Present Evidence On. And The District Court Failed To 
Consider. The First Factor In The Analysis-The Lapse Of Time Between The 
Misconduct And The Acquisition Of Evidence 
The relevant time period for the first factor is '·the elapsed time bet\wen the misconduct 
and the acquisition of the evidence." Page, 140 Idaho at 846 (emphasis added): see also 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-05 ("The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession" is 
relevant "Brown's first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by ll..'ss than two hours, 
... [ajnd the second statement was clearly the result and the fruit of the first.''); State v. 
Reynolds·, 146 Idaho 466. 474 (Ct. App. 2008) ( .. The first of th\.' three factors to be considered is 
the lapse of time between the police misconduct and [a third party's] consent In this case, that 
time period was very brief, which militates against a finding of attenuation.''): Green, 111 F.3d at 
521 ( .. only about five minutes elapsed betv\een the illegal stop of the Greens and the search of 
the car. This weighs against finding the search attenuated."). Yet the State and the district court 
believed that the relevant time period was the length of the unlmvful detention. Indeed, the 
court found that "there was a minimal lapse of time between the seizure of the license and the 
discovery a [sic] valid arrest warrant" (R .. p.66 ). and the State explained that .. if the Court 
watches that video. the Court is going to probably want to rewind it because it goes by so 
quickly. It's that quick. That plays in farnr of the State·' (5/6 14 Tr., p.40, Ls.1-3). As a result 
of this misunderstanding, the district court not only failed to consider one of the three factors 
used to determine whether the evidence is sufficiently attenuated to purge the taint of Officer 
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Curtis's illegal actions, but also appears to have inappropriately considered the length of the 
detention as an independent factor in the attenuation analysis.3 This error alone requires remand. 
What's more, the State failed to present any evidence on the relevant time period-from 
\Vhen the Officer Curtis confirmed the warrants to when the officers discovered the evidence. 
Officer Curtis only testified that '·Officer Otto assisted in getting [Mr. Cohagan's] left hand 
behind his back. We handcuffed him up and took him into custody at that point." (5/6/14 
Tr., p.19, Ls.20-22.) The court. apparently using a probable cause affidavit w-hich was not 
introduced at the suppression hearing, filled in the gaps: "During the search incident to arrest, 
officers discovered a yellow box containing a glass-smoking device with "" hite crystal residue 
that tested positive for methamphetamine." (R .. p.64.) Presumably then, the officers discovered 
the evidence relatively quickly, which vvould cut against the State. But regardless, the State 
presented no evidence or argument on the first factor and thus did not and cannot meet its 
burden. S'ee Cardenas, 143 Idaho at 908-09. 
2. The Purpose Of The Seizure And The Flagranc\ Of Officer Curtis's Actions Cuts 
Against Attenuation 
As an initial matter. the district court based its conclusion that the officers' actions were 
not sufficiently flagrant on an erroneous factual finding. The district court found "the officers' 
3 The Court of Appeals explained in Bifc;hwn: "'In a more typical attenuation case, a short lapse 
of time between the unlawful conduct and tile discovery of the challengi:d evidence weighs 
against a finding of attenuation. It appears that in Page, the Idaho Supreme Court noted the 
minimal lapse of time as evidence of a lack of flagrant conduct by the officer because the period 
of unlawful detention was short, and not as an application of the first factor of the three-factor 
test." Bigham, 141 Idaho at 734 n.1. But because Page failed to mention the correct time 
period-the lapse of time between the misconduct and the acquisition of evidence-in its 
analysis, Mr. Cohagan believes it is more likely that Page simply overlooked the difference 
between these two time periods. It would he odd for the Court to state the correct time period 
when laying out the three-factor test, and then wholly ignore that factor in its analysis. 
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conduct in the grocery store [was] unnecessary. but that '·Officer Curtis testified extensively that 
the individual resembled another suspect[. Milo Morgan,] who ht knew had an outstanding arrest 
warrant." (R., p.66.) Importantly. hov,:en~r. the district court overlooked that Officer Curtis 
already kne,v that Mr. Cohagan was not the pi.:rson they were looking for when Officer Curtis 
asked Mr. Cohagan for his license. At the suppression hearing, Officer Curtis testified as 
follov,s: 
Q. Okay. So at what point as you are approaching Mr. Cohagan did you 
realize that this was not Milo Morgan? 
A. Probablv \\hen he gets fairh close to me. Again. the clothing and stuff 
.; '--' ., L.. '--' 
he was wearing, he had a hat on that \Yas pulled down over his head. Even the 
way he \valked, looked a lot like the saunter of Milo Morgan. 
So as he got close, maybe 1 {) or 15 feet away, I realized it was not 
him, but at that point I still 1vanted to ask his name und ID him. 
(5/6.114 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-12.) Therefore, Officer Curtis's initial belief that Mr. Cohagan was Milo 
f\forgan is irrelevant to the analysis. Instead. the fact that Officer Curtis knew that Mr. Cohagan 
v,:as not the suspect, but asked for his license and ran a \varrant check anyway, increases the 
flagrancy of Officer Curtis's conduct. The omission of this fact from the district court's 
findings, and the district court's ultimate conclusion that Officer Curtis's testimony about Milo 
Morgan somehow decreased the flagrancy of Officer Curtis's misconduct, shows that the district 
court erroneously believed that Officer Curtis still thought Mr. Cohagan was Milo Morgan when 
he asked for his license. Because that oversight formed the primary basis of the court's 
conclusion that Officer Curtis· s conduct \Vas not sufficiently flagrant, it warrants reversal. 
Rather, the purpose and flagrancy of Officer Curtis's actions warrant suppressing the 
evidence. The officers stopped Mr. Cohagan not once, but twice. to confirm his identity. 
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(R., p.63; see also State's Ex. 14: 5/6/14 Tr.) By the time Officer Curtis asked for Mr. Cohagan's 
license, Officer Curtis had already realized that Mr. Cohagan was not the suspect but ·'still 
wanted to ask his name and ID him."' (5/6i14 Tr., p.28, Ls.10-12.) The only possible reason for 
doing that was to run a warrant check with l'vfr. Cohagan present-Officer Otto had already 
determined Mr. Cohagan's license was valid and the Ofiicers already kne\V Mr. Cohagan's 
name. (5/6/14 Tr., p.36, L.20 - p.37, L.l (defense counsel's argument).) ,\s the district court 
observed, the officers could just have easily run a warrant check outside of the store rather than 
returning for Mr. Cohagan's license and running a \Varrant check in his presence. (R., p.65.) 
Instead, Officer Cmtis opted to ask for Mr. Cohagen's license then follow Mr. Cohagan through 
the store \Vaiting to hear back from dispatch. (State's Ex. 1; see also 516114 Tr., p.14, L.22 
p.17. L.19.) As the Court can see on the video. the officers tlwvarted Mr. Cohagan's attempt to 
walk away from them by physically grabbing him and ordering him to .. relax:· (State ·s Ex. I; 
see also 516114 Tr., p.16, L.21 p.17, L.2.) Officer Curtis also testified that Mr. Cohagan put his 
hands in his pockets multiple times. '·which is just a common officer safety issue." (5/6/14 
Tr., p.17, L.3 p.18, L.5.) After the warrants were confirmed and the three left the store, ·'the 
video reveals yelling and an obvious struggle before the video shuts off.'' (R .. p.64.) As the 
district court noted, the officers' decision to engage Mr. Cohagan inside the store. rather than 
running the warTant check and waiting for !Vlr. Cohagan outside. needlessly put the safety of the 
officers, Mr. Cohagan, and the public at risk. (R., p.65.) 
This case goes beyond the factual situation alluded to in Bigham as being sufficiently 
flagrant to undermine the discovery of an outstanding warrant. The Bigham Court noted that 
4 The video of the incident is worth watching, as it captures the officers' tone of voice and their 
physical contact with Mr. Cohagan. 
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there ,vas ·'no evidence that [the officer] stopped Bigham solely to detenninc his identity so that 
a vvarrant check could be run. Rather. [ the officer] conducted a warrant check only after he 
recailed that Bigham's name was on a \Varrants list." Bigham, 141 Idaho 735. Here, Officer 
Curtis did not merely ask for Mr. Cohagan's license so that he could figure out his name and run 
a v,:arrant check. He in fact took it one step farther-Officer Curtis already knew Mr. Cohagan's 
name, but still asked for and held on to Mr. Cohagan 's license v-:hile he ran a ,varrant check. The 
second factor thus ·weighs heavily against attenuation-the officers detained Mr. Cohagan for a 
patently illegal purpose, f1agrantly disregarded Mr. Cohagan· s Fourth Amendment rights. and 
reckless! y put the public's safety at risk. 
,, 
.) . This Court's Holding In Page Does Not Dictate The Outcome Here 
Page sets forth the rule this Court should apply, but the analysis and holding in Page do 
not control. See Bigham. 141 Idaho at 734 -35 ( citing Page for the proposition that "[t ]he 
discovery of a warrant satisfies only the second prong by showing an intenening circumstance. 
The other factors, particularly ·the flagrancy and purpose of the impropt..:r law enforcement 
action.' must be weighed in every case to dt..:termine whether the taint of that misconduct is 
sufficiently attenuated."). As discussed abow. Page's analysis is flawed because it considered 
the wrong period of time for the first factor. But, more importantly. the facts of this case 
distinguish it from Page. 
An officer smv Page walking dmvn tht..: center of the street around two in the morning. 
Page, 140 Idaho at 842. Concerned for his well-being. the officer stopped to talk with Page, then 
asked for his license. Id at 842-43. The officer told Page he was going to check his name with 
the station to let him know who he had stopped, and then learned that Page had an outstanding 
warrant. Id. at 843. The officer arrested Page and discovered drugs during a search incident to 
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arrest Id There is no indication that the officer already knc,v Page's name but asked for his 
license just so that he could keep Page there while he ran a warrant check. that Page tried to 
leave at any point that the interaction turned physical, or that anyone else was put at risk. See 
P ar,e, 140 Idaho 841. 
The Court found that Page v.:as unlmvfully detained when the officer took Page ·s license 
to run a warrant check, but also found thm the seizure of the evidence against Page was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal detention. Id. at 845--47. The Court noted: 
[T]here was a minimal lapse of time between the seizure of the license and the 
search pursuant to a valid arrest warrant The police officer's conduct was 
certainly not flagrant, nor ,vas his purpose improper. Clearly, once the officer 
discovered that there was an outstanding warrant, an intervening event under 
Green, he did not have to release Page and was justified in arresting him at that 
point. 
Id. at 846--4 7. 
Here, on the other hand. the officers· actions ,vere flagrant and their purpose was 
improper. Officer Curtis already kne,\ Mr. Cohagan's name, but illegally detained Mr. Cohagan 
anyvvay so that he could run a ,varrant check with Mr. Cohagan present ( 5/6;14 Tr., p.28, Ls. l 0-
12); he tlnvarted :t\fr. Cohagan's attempt to go about his business at Albertson's (State's Ex. 1; 
see also 5/6/14 Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.17, L.19). and he unnecessarily put the safety of the public and 
Mr. Cohagan at risk (R., p.65). In other words, the officer in Page acted out of concern for 
Page's well-being, while Officer Curtis sought to illegally detain Mr. Cohagan with the goal of 
being able to lawfully arrest him on the spot. Considering these factual dit1erences, the outcome 
in Page does not dictate the outcome here. 
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4. Taken Together. The First And Third Factors Tip The Balance Against 
Attenuation 
Even though the outstanding 'Warrant amounts to an intervening event the discovery of 
the evidence in this case was a direct result of Officer Curtis's flagrant violation of 
Mr. Cohagan's Fourth Amendment rights--an action Officer Curtis took in order to run a 
\Varrant check \Vith Mr. Cohagan present. In other words, Officer Curtis "acquired the evidence 
from ·exploitation of [the] illegality,"' not --·by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint..,. Bigham. 141 Idaho at 734 ( quoting Cireen, 111 F .3d at 520 and vVong 
5i'un, 3 71 U.S. at 488). The evidence seiz...:d is therefore not attenuated from the Fourth 
Amendment violation-it is a direct consequence. This Court should suppress the evidence. 
5. The Deterrent Purpose Of The Exclusionary Rule Requires That This Court 
Suppress the Evidence Against '.v1r. Cohmran 
As explained in Green, 
'·The [ exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not tn repair. Its purpose is to 
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 
available way--by removing the incentive to disregard it.'' Brovvn. 422 U.S. at 
599-600. ·'Because the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to discourage 
police misconduct, application of the rule does not serve this deterrent function 
when the police action, although erroneous, \Vas not undertaken in an effort to 
benefit the police at the expense of the suspect's protected rights." United 
States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 958 (7th Cir. 1990). This harkens back to Wong 
Sun's question of whether the evidence comes to light '·by exploitation of that 
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint.'· Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. 
Green, 111 F.3d at 523 (internal citations reformatted). Similarly, "[i]n Page, the Idaho 
Supreme Court expressed its disapproval of a rule that would allow law enforcement officers ·the 
ability to initiate consensual encounters with pedestrians in order to seize identification and run a 
warrants check."' Bigham, 141 Idaho at 735. n.2. (quoting Page, 140 Idaho at 845). That is 
precisely what happened here. Officer Curtis detained Mr. Cohagan in an effort to benefit the 
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police at the expense of Mr. Cohagan's protected rights. See Green, 111 F.3d at 523. Upholding 
the district court's denial of Mr. Cohagan· s motion to suppress would send a clear message to 
law enforcement in Idaho: The Fourth Amendment gives way as soon as an Idahoan voluntarily 
hands mer his or her license. Such a message undercuts not just the purpos.: of the exclusionary 
rule, but would also eviscerate the fundamental protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 
This Court must suppress the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cohagan respectfully requests that the Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
reverse the order denying his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 2015. 
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